LORD SCARMAN AND A DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC ABUSE

Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 as new law

 

In a judgment (speech in House of Lords) in Davis v Johnson (9 March 1978; ) [1978] UKHL 1, [1979] AC 264 at 348 Lord Scarman explained the remedies provided by Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 (DVMPA 1976) s 1; and then, he defined domestic violence for the purposes of the Act:

 

… Conduct by a family partner which puts at risk the security, or sense of security, of the other partner in the home. Physical violence, or the threat of it, is clearly within the mischief. But there is more to it than that. Homelessness can be as great a threat as physical violence to the security of a woman (or man) and her children. Eviction — actual, attempted or threatened — is, therefore, within the mischief: likewise, conduct which makes it impossible or intolerable, as in the present case, for the other partner, or the children, to remain at home.

 

Lord Scarman was a pre-eminent family lawyer from a time when children law was hardly regarded as a separate discipline (think Re F (orse A) (a Minor) (Publication of Information) [1977] Fam 58, [1976] 3 WLR 813, CA;  A v Liverpool City Council [1982] AC 363, [1981] 2 WLR 948, (1981) 2 FLR 222; Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1985] UKHL 7, [1986] 1 AC 112, [1986] 1 FLR 224; Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Court’s Duty) [1984] FLR 457 for a flavour of his children law work).

 

Non-molestation orders: a new family law remedy

 

Before the quote above, Lord Scarman (who gave the fifth speech) had set out the text of s 1(1) of the Act (still no mention of domestic violence or domestic abuse – just of ‘molesting’ a party:

 

(1) Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the High Court, on an application by a party to a marriage a county court shall have jurisdiction to grant an injunction containing one or more of the following provisions, namely—

(a) a provision restraining the other party to the marriage from molesting the applicant;

(b) a provision restraining the other party from molesting a child living with the applicant;

(c) a provision excluding the other party from the matrimonial home or a part of the matrimonial home or from a specified area in which the matrimonial home is included;

(d) a provision requiring the other party to permit the applicant to enter and remain in the matrimonial home or a part of the matrimonial home, whether or not any other relief is sought in the proceedings

 

Lord Scarman explained s 1(1) as follows:

 

Subsection (1) enables a party to a marriage to make application to a county court. It is without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the High Court and it empowers a county court (any county court, whether or not invested with divorce jurisdiction) to grant an injunction “whether or not any other relief is sought.” Clearly the subsection provides a new remedy additional to, but not in substitution for, what already exists in the law.

 

Section 1(2) applied s 1(1) equally to a couple who were not married; and references to matrimonial home were to be construed accordingly.

 

Non-molestation in 1996; but still no domestic violence definition

 

And so, in 1975-6, a new family law remedy was born in the 1976 Act. It was intended to cover both the married and the unmarried, and their children: the free-standing (‘whether or not any other relief is sought’) non-molestation injunction. This is the remedy which – for today’s purposes – is reproduced in Family Law Act 1996 s 42(1):

 

42 Non-molestation orders

(1)In this Part a “non-molestation order” means an order containing either or both of the following provisions—

(a)provision prohibiting a person ( “the respondent”) from molesting another person who is associated with the respondent;

(b)provision prohibiting the respondent from molesting a relevant child.

 

The 1996 still avoided a definition of ‘domestic violence’: the rest of s 42 deals with procedural matters; whilst earlier sections of FLA 1996 had dealt with occupation orders.

 

The charming authors of Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 attempted a definition of ‘domestic violence’ which is tucked away at Sch 1 para 12(9):

 

‘domestic violence’ means any incident, or pattern of incidents, of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between individuals who are associated with each other;…

 

Contact practice direction and domestic abuse

 

In Family Procedure Rules 2010 PD12J Child Arrangements & Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm those who draft Family Procedure Rules 2010 and their accompanying practice directions have given us as a definition of domestic abuse – but only in relation to child contact. Para 4 (I set this out in full):

 

‘domestic abuse includes any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality. This can encompass, but is not limited to, psychological, physical, sexual, financial, or emotional abuse. Domestic abuse also includes culturally specific forms of abuse including, but not limited to, forced marriage, honour-based violence, dowry-related abuse and transnational marriage abandonment;…

 

In addition the terms ‘abandonment’, coercive behaviour’, controlling behaviour’ and ‘ill-treatment’ are further defined.

 

A practice direction as law

 

The first comment on this must be to recall that a rule, still less a practice direction, cannot change the law (Re Grosvenor Hotel, London (No 2) [1965] Ch 1210, CA approved by Supreme Court in Dunhill v Burgin (Nos 1 and 2) [2014] UKSC 18, [2014] 1 WLR 933 at [27]). The law is what was explained by Lord Scarman in Davis v Johnson. And anyway what does the practice direction add to what was said by Lord Scarman 40 years ago?

 

One problem with any definition is that the more extensive you make it, the weaker it is: detail only suggests more ways in which a person can wriggle round it. That is the beauty of Lord Scarman’s definition; and as law it applies to a much wider set of statutory circumstances (FLA 1996 s 42; children proceedings generally (ie not only contact); and occupation orders).

 

The practice direction is a lesser form of law, and priority when advice is given or legal aid applied for, should be given to Lord Scarman (with a nod, perhaps, to LASPOA 2012 Sch 1).

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Cross-examination by alleged abusers; and thoughts for a way through…

Abusive cross-examination: recent case-law

 

Cross-examination of complainants by their alleged abusers has had a number of outings in the past three months, including Re A (A Minor: Fact Finding; Unrepresented Party) [2017] EWHC 1195 (Fam), Hayden J and Re D (Appeal – Failure of Case Management) [2017] EWHC 1907 (Fam), Peter Jackson J. Re A has drawn at least two professorial comments in the mainstream legal press: ‘Vulnerable witnesses’ [2017] Family Law 704 by Penny Cooper and ‘Abuse upon abuse’ [2017] New Law Journal by Jonathan Herring.

 

The importance of this subject, and the inadequacy of the family proceedings system to deal fairly with it, cannot be over-emphasised. What is surprising about each of the above sources is their failure – as I read them – to deal with the recent jurisprudence on the subject. Hayden and Peter Jackson JJ (respectively at [25] and [6]) refer to Family Procedure Rules 2010 PD12J; but a practice direction is low down the citation pecking order when compared with statutory and common law (in this case Court of Appeal) authority.

 

Jurisprudence on this subject must surely touch upon at least to the following:

 

  • Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA 1999) Pt 2 (and see European Convention 1950 Art 6.3(d). The 1999 Act is the source for much of the thinking of the now stalled Vulnerable Witnesses and Children Working Group (VWCWG: touched on below) and of the proposed reforms for family proceedings by the Prison and Courts Bill cl 47 lost at the June 2017 General Election.
  • Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (MFPA 1984) s 31G(6) (referred to by Pater Jackson J, though not specifically cited); and
  • K and H (Private Law: Public Funding)[2015] EWCA Civ 543, [2016] 1 FLR 754

 

To put in context the evidence of any witness who is entitled to rely on ‘special measures’ (as explained below) it is worth recalling Lady Hale in the Supreme Court in Re A (Sexual Abuse: Disclosure) [2012] UKSC 60, [2013] 1 FLR 948 (where the Supreme Court said a vulnerable witness must submit to challenge by a defendant of her allegations):

 

[36] … Family proceedings have long been more flexible than other proceedings in [the way the court receives evidence]. The court has power to receive and act upon hearsay evidence. It is commonplace for children to give their accounts in videotaped conversations with specially trained police officers or social workers…. Oral questioning could be arranged in ways which did not involve face to face confrontation. It is not a requirement that the father be able to see [the face of the witness X]. It is, to say the least, unlikely that the court would ever allow direct questioning by the father, should he still (other than in this court) be acting in person. The court’s only concern in family proceedings is to get at the truth. The object of the procedure is to enable witnesses to give their evidence in the way which best enables the court to assess its reliability. It is certainly not to compound any abuse which may have been suffered…

 

And a thought: could a scheme akin to the Bar Pro Bono unit be devised to provide examination for the court of a witness or party who is to be cross-examined by her abuser, akin to YJCEA 1999 s 38(4); and as explained further below.

 

Statutory starting point

 

The statutory starting point is MFPA 1984 s 31G(6). This states:

 

(6)Where in any proceedings in the family court it appears to the court that any party to the proceedings who is not legally represented is unable to examine or cross-examine a witness effectively, the court is to—

(a)ascertain from that party the matters about which the witness may be able to depose or on which the witness ought to be cross-examined, and

(b)put, or cause to be put, to the witness such questions in the interests of that party as may appear to the court to be proper.

 

MFPA 1984 s 31G(6) is derived from Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 s 73 (derived from Magistrates’ Courts Act 1952). It was explained by Lord Dyson MR in Re K and H (above):

 

[42] …. [MFPA 1984 s 31G(6)] … enables the court to put questions to a witness on behalf of a party in the absence of legal representation, or to take steps itself to cause those questions to be put to enable effective examination of the witness…

 

The case concerned funding of representation by the Lord Chancellor, so comments on s 31G(6) may be said to be obiter. Whether obiter or part of the ratio the comments of Lord Dyson MR, sitting with two highly experienced family lawyers – Black and McFarlane LJJ, both of whom agreed with him – must command respect. He considered the need to the judge to ask questions in Re K and H to be ‘fairly straightforward’. Had the judge in Re D followed the district judge’s directions for the father to prepare a list of questions (as Lord Dyson MR suggested for the judge in Re K and H at [60]), that would have been satisfactory; and the judge could have taken over from there.

 

Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999

 

Reference to YJCEA 1999 Pt 2 enables a court to look – as did Roderic Wood J in the often cited case of H v L and R [2006] EWHC 3099 (Fam) [2007] 2 FLR 162 – at the statutory source of the ideas behind cl 47 (yet to re-emerge from the Ministry of Justice drafting department since the election). The context of the 1999 Act in family proceedings is fully explained in Evidence in family proceedings by David Burrows (2016, Family Law/LexisNexis) at Chs 8 (‘Special measures for receiving evidence’) and 19 (‘Children: views and evidence’).

 

For present purposes and in criminal proceedings only, an advocate can be appointed by the court to conduct cross-examination, ‘in the interests of the [defendant]’ where he – it will normally, though not invariably, be a man – has no legal representative (and see comments of Lord Bingham CJ in R v Brown (Milton) [1998] 2 Cr App Rep 364, which are said to have been partly instrumental in passing YJCEA 1999 s 38). YJCEA 1999 s 38 considers the circumstances in which, after consideration of the point, a court determines that it is ‘in the interests of justice for the witness to be cross-examined by a legal representative appointed to represent the interests of the accused’ (s 38(3)). It that case, s 38(4) continues:

 

(4)If the court decides that it is necessary in the interests of justice for the witness to be so cross-examined, the court must appoint a qualified legal representative (chosen by the court) to cross-examine the witness in the interests of the accused.

 

The legal representative will then be paid for from public funds (YJCEA 1999 s 40). If volunteer advocates (see eg Bar Pro Bono Unit) could fill this role if asked to do so by the court, might that work in the type of case which so concerned Hayden and Peter Jackson JJ? The point could be dealt with as a special measure as part of case management directions (in much the same way as seems to have been the case with the original district judge’s case management directions in Re D).

 

A practice direction: case management

 

Peter Jackson J (at [6]) drew attention to PD12J ‘Child Arrangements and Contact Order: Domestic Violence and Harm’ which he pointed out includes the following:

 

  • A definition of domestic violence that includes controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence, or abuse, including psychological, physical, sexual, financial, or emotional abuse (paragraph 3);
  • Approval for the court to question witnesses itself in order to protect alleged victims (paragraph 28):

 

He held that ‘While ensuring that the allegations are properly put and responded to, the fact-finding hearing can be an inquisitorial (or investigative) process, which at all times must protect the interests of all involved.’ He continued, dealing with the ‘fact-finding’ hearing:

 

  • Each party can be asked to identify what questions they wish to ask of the other party, and to set out or confirm in sworn evidence their version of the disputed key facts.
  • The judge or lay justices should be prepared where necessary and appropriate to conduct the questioning of the witnesses on behalf of the parties, focusing on the key issues in the case.

 

Peter Jackson J concluded this passage of his judgement:

 

[6] … Victims of violence are likely to find direct cross-examination by their alleged abuser frightening and intimidating, and thus it may be particularly appropriate for the judge or lay justices to conduct the questioning on behalf of the other party in these circumstances, in order to ensure both parties are able to give their best evidence.

 

By contrast, in Re A Hayden J stated that he refused to deal with a case in the way he had been required to do (but without reference to s 31G(6) or Re K & H:

 

[60] It is a stain on the reputation of our Family Justice system that a Judge can still not prevent a victim being cross examined by an alleged perpetrator. This may not have been the worst or most extreme example but it serves only to underscore that the process is inherently and profoundly unfair. I would go further it is, in itself, abusive. For my part, I am simply not prepared to hear a case in this way again. I cannot regard it as consistent with my judicial oath and my responsibility to ensure fairness between the parties.

 

Special measures: Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999

 

The usefulness of YJCEA 1999 Pt 2 is that is summarises categories of case (child and incapacitated witnesses) in which special measures can be used in criminal proceedings. Many of these – video links, screens etc as mentioned by Lady Hale in Re A – are in effect already in use in family proceedings; and to these can be added special rules as to hearsay and ABE interviews for children proceedings. YJCEA 1999 s 18 (with Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 Part 18 and its supporting practice direction) defines how special measures directions at YJCEA 1999 ss 23-30 are to be made available by the court. The working of special measures was explained by Lady Hale in R (D (a minor)) v Camberwell Green Youth Court [2005] UKHL 4, [2005] 1 WLR 393.

 

Amongst the forms of special measure under YJCEA 1999 and already available in family proceedings are:

 

  • preventing a witness from seeing a party, by ‘screen or other arrangement’ (YJCEA 1999 s 23);
  • allowing a witness to give evidence by live link (s 24);
  • hearing a witness’ evidence to the exclusion of others (s 25);
  • admitting video recorded evidence or cross-examination (ss 17 and 28; and see ABE evidence in the case of child or other intimidated witness);
  • questioning a witness through an intermediary (s 29): in principle and if funding (eg by legal aid is available) in principle this form of assistance should be available in family proceedings.

 

Pro bono assistance as a special measure

 

Special measures are available. With imaginative case management – and perhaps eg the funding of proper video-link equipment in family courts – intimidated witnesses can be helped already in family courts.

 

Pending further family law legislation promised by the Government, could pro bono (free) advocacy assistance as a special measures direction equivalent to YJCEA 1999 s 38(4) be a way to help in cases identified by the judges referred to above. Even could this be funded as an exceptional case determination (Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 s 10(3); and see ‘Funding implications for vulnerable witnesses’ [2017] Legal Action at 6).

Dear Lord Chancellor – ‘domestic abuse’: time for a consistent approach in English law

A modern definition for Ministry of Justice

 

The Prison and Courts Bill clause 47 helpfully deals cross-examination of complainants as witnesses in family law domestic abuse proceedings.

 

The Sentencing Council have rephrased its proposed Guidance with the proposition that ‘domestic abuse’ replace ‘domestic violence’ as the criterion which – if accepted – should guide judges in sentencing of offenders http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Intimidatory-offences-Consulation-Paper-WEB.pdf. A definition suggested by the draft Guidance is set out at the end of this letter. This is based on the Council’s view that the Guidance should be revised:

 

‘… to reflect the important changes in terminology, expert thinking and societal attitudes over the last ten years, in this important area of sentencing. ‘Domestic abuse’ is now the term used, rather than ‘domestic violence’, to reflect that both physical violence and controlling and coercive behaviour constitute abuse in domestic settings.’

 

Meanwhile family courts forms adhere to the old-fashioned ‘domestic violence’ terminology; and Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 Sch 1 para 12 adheres to the more restrictive, ‘domestic violence’:

 

Victims of domestic violence and family matters

12(1)Civil legal services provided to an adult (“A”) in relation to a matter arising out of a family relationship between A and another individual (“B”) where—

(a)there has been, or is a risk of, domestic violence between A and B, and

(b)A was, or is at risk of being, the victim of that domestic violence.

 

A definition of ‘domestic violence’ was added in 2013 by Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Amendment of Schedule 1) Order 2013 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/748/article/4/:
‘“domestic violence” means any incident, or pattern of incidents, of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between individuals who are associated with each other;’.

 

This sounds to me as if abuse is an aspect of violence – which it can be; but that a Legal Aid Agency decision-maker could say that the more extensive definition (ie domestic abuse) is not comprised always in the more restrictive (ie domestic violence).

 

The wider spectrum of domestic abuse is applied to children and ‘vulnerable’ adults (LASPOA 2012 Sch 1 para 3); but not to others in a family relationship. Is that a fair assumption?

 

Time for reform: Prison and Courts Bill

 

Is it not time to amend the narrower, unfair (to the person abused) and out-moded definition – namely ‘domestic violence’ – in legal aid legislation, family law forms and in any other circumstances? The wider ‘domestic abuse’ would be applied always for grant of legal aid? You would have one consistent set of terminology for all relevant circumstances.

 

If you agree is not the Prison and Courts Bill a good opportunity to do this?

 

Yours sincerely

 

 

 

David Burrows

 

 

Scope of the [Sentencing Council] guideline

 

  1. This guideline identifies the principles relevant to the sentencing of cases involving domestic abuse. There is no specific offence of domestic abuse, it is a general term describing a range of violent and/or controlling or coercive behaviour.

 

  1. A useful, but not statutory, definition of domestic abuse used by the Government is:

 

Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are, or have been, intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality. The abuse can encompass, but is not limited to: psychological, physical, sexual, financial, or emotional.

 

  1. Controlling behaviour is a range of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capabilities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and/or regulating their everyday behaviour.

 

  1. Coercive behaviour is an act or pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim.

 

  1. The Government definition includes so called ‘honour’ based abuse, such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage. Domestic abuse occurs amongst men and women, people of all ethnicities, sexualities, ages, disabilities, immigration status, religion or beliefs, and socio-economic backgrounds. Care should be taken to avoid stereotypical assumptions regarding domestic abuse.